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HAS THE FISCAL COURT OF THE COUNTY THE
AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE A FIRE TRUCK?
AN INTERPRETATION OF SEC. 1840, KENTUCKY STATUTES*
FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT*"
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, Ln RELATION, ETC., Appellants.
vs-OPnoN No. 16,326
FAYETTE COUNTY, Appellee.
On January 24, 1931, the Fiscal Court of Fayette County
voted an appropriation of the sum of $10,000.00 for the year of
1931 to be used for the purpose of purchasing a fire truck, the
order of said court therefor being as follows.
"On motion of Justice Spurr, seconded by Justice Fister that an
appropriation of $10,000.00 be made for the year, 1931. Said appropria-
tion to be made for the purpose of purchasing a fire truck and said
appropriation to be placed in court costs and miscellaneous budget of
the General Fund.
"Motion carried by the following votes: Ayes: Justices Kiger,
Jordan, Boone, Lawrence, Karsner, Spurr and Fister. Noes: none."
On January 28, 1931, the court adopted a resolution whereby
a special committee of the court was appointed, and authorized,
instructed, empowered and directed to purchase a fire truck and
equipment for the use of Fayette County, in that portion of the
county situated outside of the city limits of the city of Lexing-
ton, at a cost not to exceed the sum of $10,000.00.
On January 28, 1931, the Commonwealth of Kentucky in
relation to George W Vaughn, County Attorney of Fayette
County, and George W Vaughn, as county attorney of Fayette
County, objected to the aforesaid action of the Fiscal Court, and
*This is the first of a series of certain of Judge King Swope's
opinions. Judge Swope presides over the Fayette Circuit Court. In
many instances these opinions will discuss the constitutionality of
statutes and questions not as yet passed upon by the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky.
**Afflirmed by Court of Appeals, 239 Ky. 485, 39 S. W (2d) 962
(1931).
KENTUCKY LAW JOUNAL
appealed therefrom to tins Court by filing copies of said order
and resolution, and asking that the same be adjudged to be null
and void. r
On February 7, 1931, by agreement, there was filed in this
appeal, a resolution passed by said Fiscal Court, wich states,
among other things, that, for a number of years the City of Lex-
ington has been sending its fire engine outside of the city limits
of Lexington to furnish fire protection to people and property
of Fayette County, but that the city had served notice on the
Fiscal Court that after February 10, 1931, it would not send its
fire apparatus beyond the city limits unless the Fiscal Court
would agree to pay the City therefor the sum of $100.00 for any
part of the first hour for one fire company, and the further sum
of $50.00 for any part of any hour thereafter, and an additional
sum of $50.00 for extra help, and any expenses incurred by rea-
son of damage to fire apparatus while making such calls to be
borne by the Fiscal Court. That the City of Lexington had
offered to man, house and service a fire truck for county runs
outside of the city limits, if the county would purchase such a
fire truck. It is further set forth in said resolution that much
of Fayette County outside of the city limits of Lexington is
closely built up, and is composed of valuable property, winch
makes up a considerable portion of the taxable property of
Fayette County, that if a fire would break out in one of these
residential sections where there is not adequate means of fire
fighting, it would spread to adjoining houses, resulting not only
in loss to the owners, but also in a loss to Fayette County by the
reduction of the assessable value of such property The resolu-
tion further recites that Fayette County owns the following
property situated in Fayette County outside of the city limits of
Lexington, namely, one main building used as the County In-
firmary, worth approximately $85,000.00; and one large dwell-
ing house, a number of small cottages and a barn worth approxi:
mately $15,000.00, a dwelling house and outbuildings on the
Leestown Pike worth approximately $25,000.00, a building and
equipment at the County Rock Quarry worth approximately
$5,000.00; that in said territory there are situated buildings used
for a Remount Station jointly owned by Fayette County and the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, worth approximately $7,500.00,
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and thirty-nme school buildings erected by the tax payers of the
county worth approxinately the sum of $400,000.00, and that
all of said buildings are without any fire protection whatever;
that the lives and property of the citizens of Fayette County
residing on the outside of the city limits of Lexington are
endangered thereby, that the property of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky situated outside of the city limits of Lexington, in
Fayette County, and property of the county and its citizens and
taxpayers situated in said territory, and the lives of the inmates
of said property, and of the citizens and taxpayers occupying
the same will all be endangered by the loss by fire unless a fire
engine and equipment be purchased for such use of Fayette
County, and, that therefore, an emergency exists in Fayette
County requiring the Fiscal Court to take innmediate action to
protect the lives and property of the citizens and taxpayers of
Fayette County, and the property of Fayette Cqunty, and the
Commonwealth of Kentucky situated therein against loss- by fire.
On February 7, 1931, the parties to tbis appeal filed an
agreed statement of facts herein, containing substantially a
recital of the same facts embodied in the foregoing resolution,
and in addition thereto stipulating that Fayette County was
without "adequate fire protection", and that if a fire truck is
purchased, $10,000.00 is a reasonable sum to be expended there-
for; and that the school buildings above mentioned have cisterns
from winch a water supply may be drawn by any fire engine to
fight a fire, and that the engine which the county contemplated
purchasing will carry a reserve of 500 gallons of water.
The only question to be decided by the Court on this appeal
is whether the Fiscal Court has the authority to make an appro-
priation from the funds of the county to purchase said fire truck.
The Fiscal Court is a tribunal of limited powers, and has
no jurisdiction to appropriate county funds, except as it is
authorized by law to do so. Morgantoum Deposit Banlk v John-
son, 108 Ky 507, Jefferson County v Young, 120 Ky 546, Jef-
ferson County v. Peter, 127 Ky 453.
The powers of the Fiscal Court as defined by Section 1840
of the Kentucky Statutes are
"The Fiscal Court shall have jurisdiction to appropriate county
funds authorized by law to be appropriated; to erect and keep in repair
necessary public buildings, secure a sufficient jail and comfortable aifd
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convenient place for holding court at the count seat; to erect and
keep in repair bridges and other structures and superintend the same;
to regulate and control the fiscal affairs and property of the county;
to make provisions for the maintenance of the poor, and provide a
poor house and farm and provide for the care, treatment and main-
tenance of the sick and poor, and provide a hospital for said purposes,
or contract with any hospital in the county to do so, and provide for
the good condition of the highways in the county, and to appropriate
county funds to make provisions to secure immigration into the county,
and to advertise the resources of the county, and to appropriate county
funds for the benefit of colleges and for infirmaries for the sick located
in the county, and to execute all of its orders consistent with the law
and within its jurisdiction, and shall have jurisdiction of all such
other matters relating to the levying of taxes as is by special act now
conferred on the county court of levy and claims."
In order for this Court to determine whether the Fiscal
Court may appropriate county funds for the purchase of a fire
truck, it becomes necessary to examine the above Statute, and
determine if the purchase of such a truck comes within the
powers above enumerated.
It will be seen that the Statute provides, among other things,
that "the Fiscal Court shall have jurisdiction to appropriate
county funds" "to erect and keep in repair necessary
public buildings" "to make provisions for the main-
tenance of the poor and provide a Poor House and Farm and
provide for the care, treatment and maintenance of the sick and
poor, and to provide a hospital for such purpose" "to
regulate and control the fiscal affairs and property of the
county "
Considering these last mentioned powers in the order named,
we see that the Fiscal Court can "erect" and "keep in repair
necessary public buildings" Obviously, the Fiscal Court can
erect, reconstruct and repair all necessary public buildings, that
power being included in the words "keep in repair" The
Statute not only gives the Fiscal Court the power to appropriate
county funds to repair all necessary buildings, but also gives it
the power to appropriate county funds to "keep in repair" all
necessary public buildings. To "keep in repair" is a greater
power than to merely 'repair' Webster defines the word
"keep" as meaning "to preserve from danger, harm or loss, to
guard, to cause to remain in a given situation or condition, to
remain intact." 35 Corpus Juris, p. 898, also defines the word
"keep" as meaning "to cause to continue without essential
change of conditions" Applying these definitions to the word-
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ing of the above portion of See. 1840 of the Kentucky Statutes,
it would appear that the Fiscal Court has the power to appro-
priate county funds not only to erect and repair all necessary
buildings, but to "keep in repair" the said buildings, which
means to protect them from danger, harm or loss, and to cause
them to remam in a state of repair. It is as necessary to pro-
tect buildings from fire, as it is to protect them from any of the
other elements. The right to perform that duty includes the
means reasonably necessary to its accomplishment. By the
agreed statement of facts filed in this case, it appears that there
are approx mately $137,500.00 worth of public buildings belong-
ng to Fayette County, and situated in Fayette County outside
of the limits of the City of Lexington, and $100,000.00 worth of
school houses erected by the taxpayers' money,--and while the
school levy is made separate from the county levy, the same
taxpayers are taxed to raise the General Fund and the School
Fund,-and that all of these buildings are without any protec-
tion whatever from loss by fire. It is a matter of common knowl-
edge, and of which this Court takes notice, that fire is one of the
greatest menaces and hazards not only to the repair, but also to
the very existence of a building. It is also common knowledge
that a fire truck, such as is contemplated being purchased, if
properly manned by experienced firemen, is a great protection
to public property, and will reduce the hazard of fire, and thereby
would help "to keep in repair" the public buildings and prop-
erty of the county
Taking up the next power above mentioned, we find that the
Fiscal Court has the right to appropriate funds "to make pro-
visions for the maintenance of the poor -and provide a Poor
House and Farm, and provide for the care, treatment and main-
tenance of the sick and poor, and provide a hospital for said
purpose" Fayette County, at an expenditure of approximately
$100,000.00, has provided a County Infirmary for the above pur-
pose, which, although very near Lexington, nevertheless is beyond
the city limits, and the buildings thereon, and the patients
therein are without any protection from fire whatever. A fire
truck, such as is planned to be purchased, could run from the
fire station in Lexington to said Infirmary in five to eight minutes
at the most, and in the event of a fire, with a crew of trained fire-
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men, could probably save not only the property of the county,
but the very lives of the patients interned there. There are over
one hundred persons in the County Infirmary, most of them are
old and infirm and a large number of them are bed ridden.
Few, if any, of the inmates of the County Infirmary would be
physically able to render any assistance in fighting a fire, or to
use the limited and inadequate fire apparatus installed in the
building, should a fire occur. It would seem that the authority
to make provision for the maintenance of the poor, to provide a
Poor House, to provide for the care, treatment, and maintenance
of the sick, and to provide a hospital for such purpose, would
include the power to make all adequate provisions for fire
apparatus to protect these buildings and the lives of the patients
who are interned therein.
In the case of Cam v. Burroughs Adding Machine Co., 180
Ky 568, it was held that the Fiscal Court had authority under
the Statute supra to purchase an adding machine for the County
Clerk. The Court said.
"The first question presented for decision by the appeal is, whether
the fiscal court had authority to purchase for its use or that of the
county clerk an adding machine. We think this qUestion must be
given an affirmative answer. It is true the fiscal court is a court of
limited jurisdiction, and, therefore, without power to appropriate
county funds except as authorized by law. Jefferson County v. Young,
120 Ky 456;, Hollis, et al. v. Wessenger, County Judge, 142 Ky. i29.
It is likewise true that state and county governments never become
debtors by implication; in order to show. that the state or county is
responsible for a claim or demand the claimant must show a legal ob-
ligation on the part of the state or county to pay it. Allen v. MercerCounty, 174 Ky. 566. We think that the authority to purchase an add-
ing machine like that here in controversy is conferred upon the fiscal
court by Kentucky Statutes, Section 1840. In Simons v. Cregory, etc.,
120 Ky. 123, we held that the fiscal court of Jefferson County was
authorized to make an appropriation to provide an elevator for the
court house, as elevators were in common use in Louisville for access
to the several stories of a building like that of the Jefferson County
Court House and were necessary for that purpose. In Hollis v. Weis.
senger, supra, it was held that electric fans could be purchased by
the fiscal cour4 for the use of the county clerk's office, because such
fans are in common use and recognized as a necessity in such public
buildings, and in the clerk's office in question were indispensably sobecause of the unsanitary conditions obtaining therein. It is further
true that adding machines are not expressly mentioned in Kentucky
Statutes, Section 1840; but neither are elevators, electric fans and other
things indispensably necessary to the proper condhct of the business
of the court, such as.typewriters, pens, pencils, ink, paper and books,
authority to purchase which by the fiscal courts has never been
doubted. The adding machine not only facilitates the work required of
county officers such as clerks of the courts, sheriff, etc., but its accuracy
is such as ,to prevent errors in the computation of figures. Indeed, it
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may well be said that an adding machine has become a practical
necessity in the proper conduct of the business of a court controlling
the fiscal affairs of a county."
Times and conditions have changed greatly smue the enact-
ment of that Statute (1840) and what would have been con-
sidered adequate means of keeping public buildings m repair at
that time would be wholly inadequate today, likewise what would
have been adequate provision for the care, treatment and main-
tenance of the poor and sick twenty-five years ago would today
almost be considered neglect. Fire buckets and hand fire ex-
tinguishers are as much out of date for fire fighting and protect-
ing buildings as was the antiquated equipment which the Court
of Appeals in the above decision held nught be superseded by
modern appliances.
If the Fiscal Court is authorized, as was held in Holli$ v
Wesssenger, supra, to install electric fans in the office of the
county clerk, upon the ground that they are in common use and
recognized as a necessity in public buildings,-if the Fiscal Court
is authorized, as was held in Cain v Burroughs Adding Machkne
Company, supra, to make an appropriation for an adding
machine to facilitate the work of the County Clerk, to prevent
error,-if the Fiscal Court has the authority to appropriate for
an elevator, as was held in Simons v. Gregory, supra, as elevators
are in common use, then certainly the Fiscal Court has power to
purchase fire apparatus to protect the buildings already erected,
and protect the lives of those charges of the County located
therein. A modern fire truck is as much in common use today
and as much of an improvement over the old bucket brigade of
yesterday as the elevator is over the stair case or the electric fan
is over the palm leaf or the adding machine is over the old fash-
ioned ciphering.
Undoubtedly the county had the right to purchase fire ex-
tingishers, hose, sprinklers, and fire escapes or any other equip-
ments or machines necessary in the buildings at the" County
Infirmary, to protect them from fire and to reduce the fire rates,
if the county had the right to do tins then, in line with the above
decision, it would have the right to adopt more modern and
up-to-date methods, and therefore purchase motorized fire
engines to be kept in the city of Lexington and manned by expert
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firemen, which could reach, not only the Infirmary, but the other
buildings of the county as well, within a few minutes after
receiving the alarm.
The county attorney has filed an able brief, m which he
insists that the law as written prohibits the Fiscal Court from
expending the money of the county for the purpose of purchas-
ing a motorized fire engine. In support of ins contention he
relies on the case of Jefferson County v. Peter, 1.27 Ky 453, and
so much of the case of Hollis v Wesssenger, 142 Ky 129, as holds
that the Fiscal Court of Jefferson County was not authorized to
purchase an automobile for the Fiscal Court m which to make
its inspections. With that contention this Court does not agree,
nor does it believe that the case he relies on supports his posi-
tion. Taking those cases in the order named we find that m the
case of Jefferson County v Peter, the Court of Appeals said
that taxes could be levied only for public purposes, and
that laws authorizing the appropriation of public funds
are not to extend by construction beyond the natural and
fair meaning of the words used. That Court m the case referred
to sums up its decision to the effect that the Fiscal Court is with-
out authority to pay the County Clerk for services for winch the
Statutes made no provision, and that the Fiscal Court had no
authority to pay the County Treasurer for extra services rend-
ered to the County,-and in that case held that the Fiscal Court
was without authority to pay interest in a certain case. Neither
that case nor the authorities cited therein can be considered as
authority against the purchase of a fire engine for theprotection
of the property of the county and the property of all.the citizens
and taxpayers of the county Tins is not a matter of paying
some officer a greater compensation than that allowed by law,-
nor is it to be compared with the payment of interest in a certain
case where the law made no provision for interest. It is the use
of a very small part of the taxpayers' money for the purpose of
protecting the property and lives of all the taxpayers, and for
the purpose of protecting all of the public buildings of the county
outside of the city limits of Lexington.
In the case of Hollis v. Wessenger, 142 Ky 129, the second
case relied upon by the County attorney, the Fiscal Court of
Jefferson County purchased an automobile for the use of the
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Committee of the Fiscal Court in investigating the County roads,
and the Appellate Court held such act unlawful and beyond the
jurisdiction of the Court, because the Statutes do not permit the
purchase of an automobile or any other kind of vehicle for the
use of the members of the Fiscal Court, or any employe of the
county in the performance of any duty or inspection or super-
vision required of them. In that case the objection- was not
directed at the kind of vehicle, but the purpose to which it was
to be put, and the question decided there was the right of the
Court to furish a certain cominttee of said Fiscal Court the
convenience of means of transportation, and did not determine
the right of the Fiscal Court to purchase a motorized fire engine
to be used, not for the convenience of the Fiscal Court itself or
for any other officer, but to protect and preserve the property of
the County The same case held, as above stated, that the Court
might properly purchase electric fans for the County Clerk's
office. The automobile being a mere convenience for a committee
of the Fiscal Court, whereas, electric fans, being in common use
and a necessity, contributed not only to the health of the work-
ing force of said office, but to the comfort and health of all per-
sons thronging said office on business.
-In the case of Jefferson County v Young, 120 Ky 546, 86
S. W 985, relied on by the Attorney General in his opinion, the
Court of Appeals held that the Fiscal Court was without author-
ity to have certain plats made for the assessor, which would assist
him in making his assessment. But that case only goes to the
extent of holding that the Fiscal Court had no right to furnish
the Assessor with certain conveniences in the way of maps and
charts, and the question there determined was. the power of the
Fiscal Court to furmsh a certain officer with certain conveni-
ences, which was the same question before that Court in the
case of Hollis v. Wesssenger, supra, but here, the appropriation
was not for the mere convenience and accommodation of a mere
officer or committee, but for a necessity which would be for the
use and benefit of all the taxpayers, and for the protection of
property purchased with the taxpayers' money
In the case of Taylor v Rsny, 156 Ky 393, 161 S. W 204,
the question was before the Court of Appeals as to the right of
the Fiscal Court to employ accountants for the purpose of in-
K. L.-7
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vestigating the affairs of various County officerg. Tins case was
decided December 11, 1913, and at that time Section 1840 of the
Kentucky Statutes, defining the jurisdiction and power of the
Fiscal Court, did not contain the provision which it now con-
tains authorizing the county to have county offices audited, etc.,
this provision having been added by amendment of 1922. The
Court of Appeals in holding that the Fiscal Court had authority
to make an expenditure for this purpose said.
"The fiscal court is charged by statute with the duty of looking
after the fiscal affairs of the county, and this puts upon it the responsi-
bility that attaches to any other business body, and, if it could not,
when the occasion arises to demand it, have an investigation made of
the books, and accounts, and records of any one or more of the officers,
agents or employees of the county who have the control of or right
to receive pay out of the funds of the county, the court could not, ift
any proper manner, perform the duty required of it in the manage-
ment of the fiscal affairs of the county. There is scarcely a business
institution in the state of any magnitude that does hot have its books
examined by some skilled accountant, and there are many good reasons
why the fiscal court should be permitted to exercise this character of
supervision over the persons charged with the dollection or expendi-
ture of the public funds."
It will be noted that at that time there was no provision of
the Statute authorizing this expenditure but the Court held
under that part of the Statute which provides that the Fiscal
Court shall have jurisdiction "to regulate and control the fiscal
affairs and property of the County", the Court might deem it
wise and expedient to investigate the affairs of one or more of the
officers, agents and employees of the county, and that they could
not make this without employing some competent attorney
It is stated in the opinion of the Court that there is scarcely
a business institution in this state that does not have its books
examined by a skilled accountant and that there are many good
reasons why a Court should be permitted to exercise this super-
vision over persons charged with the collection and expendi-
ture of public funds. On the same principle we can say that
there is scarcely a business institution in the State that does not
make provision to protect its houses, buildings, and property
from destruction by Jfte, and to do this they employ modern
methods.
Certainly the County has as much right to protect the prop-
efty of the county and of its citizens and taxpayers, which is
the property upon which taxes are paid to taise the revenue -of
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the county, as it has to expend money to make an investigation
of the affairs of the officers of the county
In the case of Jefferson County v. Jefferson County FiscaZ
Court, 161 Ky 538, 170 S. W 1171, the County Attorney took
an appeal from certain orders of the Fiscal Court and thereafter
the Fiscal Court entered an order employing attorneys to repre-
sent it on appeal. There is nothing in Section 1840 which
authorizes the Fiscal Court to employ special counsel, but the
Court of Appeals held in that case, and in other cases that the-
Fiscal Court had the power to employ counsel to represent the
County where its interests were concerned. The Court said
"The power to regulate and control the fiscal affairs of the
county necessarily carries with it. the power to employ counsel
when counsel is necessary to protect the interests of the County"
If the fiscal court has a right to employ counsel when for
some reason the County Attorney cannot represent it, it certainly
would have the right to buy a fire engine with which to protect
the property of the county
As pointed out by Judge Adams, one of the defeadatits
herein, in his able brief, in some of the cases holding that the
Fiscal Court did not have the authority to docertain things, the
Court of Appeals has held that the power to do that particular
thing had been delegated to some other officer, and where thi
authority had been delegated to some other officer, and not speci,
fically delegated to the Fiscal Court, there was no reason in hold.
ing that thp Fiscal Court had that authority
In regard to the purchase of a fire truck for the protection
of the property of the county, this authority had not been dele-
gated to any one else. If the property of Fayette County, the
public property in Fayette County, and the lives and property
-f citizens and wards of Fayette County outside the city limits
are to be protected against fire, they must be protected by the
Fiscal Court.
The County would have no authority to purchase a fire tr116k
for the protection of property within the city limits, because the
city is given the specific right and it is made the duty- of the bity-
to provide fire protection within the city limits. In a number bf
eases the questioll has been raised.as to Whethelr or liot the Fiscal
Coirt has atithofity under the Statute conferring general authot-
KENTUCKY LAW JoURNA
ity for payment for services to an officer to search out omitted
property to have it assessed. The Courts have held that if there
is some officer whose duty it is to find omitted property, and have
it assessed, then the Fiscal Court has no authority to employ some
one else to do this work. As above pointed out, no one else has
authority to protect the property of the county, and the lives of
the public charges of the county in these buildings, or the prop-
erty and lives of the citizens and taxpayers in this county except
-the Fiscal Court.
Mention has been hereinabove made of the number of school
buildings located in the county, which were erected by the money
of the taxpayers. If these buildings burn, and have to be re-
placed, it will add an additional burden to all of the taxpayers
in the county outside of the city limits. It is a well known fact
that these buildings house hundreds of children of tender years,
and fire protection for those buildings and those children is a
demand and a necessity The Fiscal Court is expected to act in
the conduct of county affairs as an ordinarily prudent business
man would act in transacting his own affairs. Certainly the
Fiscal Court would be censured if it spent a huge sum of money
in building a county infirmary or some other county institution
and then failed to take out fire insurance on such buildings. It
nght as justly be censured if it failed to take necessary steps
to adequately protect the county buildings from fire and to pro-
tect the lives of the inmates of those buildings. If a building
is destroyed by fire, fire insurance will help to rebuild the build-
ing, but it would not restore the life that might be lost in the
conflagration, neither would it keep the county nor the inmates
of such buildings from suffering great inconvemence and hard-
ship during the time such building was being rebuilt.
There are other considerations which make it equally im-
perative that the Fiscal Court take such action, among which is
the fact that as set forth in the resolution herein, there are
thickly populated residential sections existing iu Fayette County
outside the city limits of Lexington, composed of costly and
valuable residences, stock barns and other valuable property,
and that it is an absolute necessity that the county have fire pro-
tection outside the city limits. Should a fire break out in any
of these residential sections, it would result m a conflagration
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that would greatly reduce the assessable property of the county,
and thereby reduce the amount of taxable property m the
county, and the revenue of the county derived therefrom.
Tins court is of the opinion that under the statute, supra,
it was not only within the right and power of the Fiscal Court
to make the appropriation in question, but that it was the duty
of that Court to do so. The appeal will be dismissed, and the
Clerk is directed to make tins opinion a part of the record.
KING SwoPE,
Judge, Fayette Circuit Court.
